Issue 9 February - May 2002by Peter Gastrow

While leaders in Southern Africa argue at regional summits about the need to develop closer economic integration amongst SADC countries, organised criminal groups have already succeeded in creating a free-trade zone for illicit commerce in the region. According to Commissioner Frank Msutu, the Head of the Sub-regional Bureau of Interpol in Harare, “There are very clear relationships and interlinking factors between crime syndicates operating in Southern Africa. It is not a secret to law enforcement agencies in the region that the criminals in the region have better co-operation links than the police officers do. They seem to know who to contact at all times and budgetary constraints, foreign currency shortages, visa problems or governmental authority to travel do not control their movements”. Surprisingly, a recent survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) indicates that organised criminal groups from within the various SADC countries, and not foreign groups (such as the Russian Mafia or Chinese Triads) are behind much of the crime in the region. In the survey, police agencies from Southern African countries were asked to identify the three transnational organised criminal groups that constituted the most serious threat to their countries. The results are summarised below:


Top three trans-national criminal groups CHART


Overall, South Africans and Nigerians feature as the most prominent national groups. If only those groups from within the SADC region are considered, however, then it would seem that South African, Zimbabwean, and Zambian criminal groups have been most successful in developing a solid “market penetration” in the SADC region. South African criminal groups feature prominently as far north as Tanzania and constitute a serious threat in each of the eight countries mentioned, except for in Swaziland. The rapid expansion of legitimate trade and investment from South Africa into other African countries has apparently been accompanied by a parallel growth in illegal activity. These syndicates deal in a range of illicit commodities, but thus far, the most important has been stolen and hijacked motor vehicles. The ISS survey showed that in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, vehicle theft and smuggling constituted the most serious threat of all organised criminal activities. In Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia, it was regarded as the second or third most serious threat. The network of criminal groups specialising in trading stolen cars stretches across all SADC countries. Vehicles stolen in Namibia have been traced to Angola, while South Africa’s stolen vehicles have been found in every SADC country and in counties even further afield. In addition to this outflow, a small percentage of vehicles stolen in the region, mainly luxury and 4X4 vehicles, find their way into South Africa. Throughout the region, stolen motor vehicles constitute a currency with which to pay for other illicit goods, such as narcotics or illegal firearms. During 2000, a total of 100 647 motor vehicles and motor cycles were reported stolen in South Africa. In addition, police recorded a total of 14 999 cases of motor vehicle ‘hijacking’ (the taking of a vehicle from the driver through force or the threat of force). Thus, a total of 115 646 motor vehicles was channelled from legitimate ownership into the criminal market during 2000 in South Africa alone. Most of these vehicles were taken by organised criminal groups. The police estimate that close on 50% of the vehicles reported stolen or hijacked are smuggled across South Africa’s borders to Southern African countries and beyond. It is important to note that a considerable number of these vehicles may not have been stolen or hijacked at all, but rather only reported as such for the purposes of laying false insurance claims. For example, the Tanzanian police have complained that they are holding hundreds of vehicles reported stolen in South Africa but find some of the original South African vehicle owners reluctant to recover them. Tanzanian police investigations have shown that some of the original owners had sold their vehicles and then reported them stolen in order to collect from their insurance companies. The expansion of the “common criminal market” in the SADC region has also occurred in the areas of armed robbery, dealing in narcotics, and the smuggling of firearms. Increasingly, organised groups from one country join those in neighbouring countries to commit serious heists or armed robberies. Two South Africans are presently opposing proceedings to extradite them to Namibia where they are alleged to have participated in the “Karibib heist”, a daring armed robbery involving N$5 million from a light aircraft that had just landed at a small air strip. Other similar robberies and heists, involving South Africans and Namibians, have occurred in Namibia. Swaziland and Lesotho have also experienced armed robberies involving South Africans. In South Africa, Zimbabwean criminal groups are increasingly linked to organised robberies, particularly in the Gauteng area. The trafficking of firearms and narcotics is also a well-known regional phenomenon, with the conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo ensuring that the erstwhile supply of firearms from Mozambique is continued from fresh sources. No SADC country is spared when it comes to illicit cross-border dealing in drugs and firearms. In Zambia, the police regard the illicit trafficking in firearms by organised criminal groups as constituting the most serious organised crime threat to their country. Malawi police regard the dealing in illicit firearms and armed robbery as among the top three most serious crime threats. South African police run regular operations to try and stem the smuggling of arms in areas bordering on Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. In short, criminals in the SADC region have joined together in a range of enterprises to create one common criminal market for themselves. This has implications for law enforcement agencies that have been operating under conditions where, in the words of Commissioner Frank Msutu, “the criminals in the region have better co-operation links than the police officers”. The bottom line is that when organised crime has gone regional, the police response needs to be regional as well, and when co-operation amongst organised crime groups has increased, co-operation amongst police agencies simultaneously needs to increase. It appears that significant steps are being made to promote exactly this kind of collective activity. The SADC policing agencies have themselves taken important initiatives to start developing effective regional responses to organised crime. In 1995, the police chiefs from various member states established the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). Their main objective was to promote regional police co-operation in combating cross-border crime. As part of this co-operation, at least nine joint regional police operations have been held in SADC member states since 1997. The joint operations confirmed the interlinking nature of the crimes and the co-operation between criminal groups from various countries in the region. For example, during “Operation V4”-conducted in 1997 in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia-a total of 1576 stolen motor vehicles were recovered and many arrests were made. The police established that the criminals involved with these activities could be linked to two very clearly structured crime syndicates. According to Msutu, both of these criminal groups were found to have “ascertainable links in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa and Botswana” . SARPCCO has also initiated regional co-operation in a number of other areas, such as training, the harmonisation of legislation, and the sharing of information. Whilst resource constraints and the vast regions involved have meant that these efforts have not yet managed to provide a long-term deterrent to transnational criminal activity in the region, individual operations have been highly successful for the short-term. During 2000 for example, SARPCCO introduced a SARPCCO Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate in order to curb cross-border motor vehicle theft. This certificate had to be produced for every vehicle crossing national borders. For a while, this curbed the activities of criminal groups smuggling vehicles, but within a year loopholes and methods to circumvent the certificates had been found. This case-in-hand underscores the need for flexible and innovative approaches to combating the regional crime problem. Far more thought needs to be given to unorthodox methods of obstructing criminal commerce as conventional police operations aimed at arresting those involved will not increase the risk for organised criminal groups enough to curtail their activities. Ingenuity and persistence will be required, as well as the ability to continuously adapt ideas and strategies as well as to develop new ones. A two-pronged approach is essential: SARPCCO needs to continue to enhance regional co-operation in law enforcement, and efforts aimed at disrupting and undermining the criminal market need to be advanced. The most effective international best practises need to be taken on board in these ventures. From a legitimate business person or investor’s point of view, the legitimate market and a flourishing criminal market can never be easy bedfellows. Whilst a flourishing business sector does not necessarily undermine a criminal market, the opposite is certainly the case. When the criminal markets expand, investor confidence is negatively affected, the formal market becomes skewed, production costs are increased, corruption becomes common practice and normal safety and security is undermined. Increased national and regional efforts to combat organised crime will be necessary to prevent the criminal market in the SADC region from consolidating, and criminal groups from achieving further market penetration. If this does not happen, attempts to dislodge them will become even more difficult in future.

Author's Contact Details
Author: Peter Gastrow
Email: gastrow@iss.co.za